



“Kek kek”: Translating Birds in Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls


[Birds] often engage in social relations with other members of their species; and they communicate with them by acoustic means recalling articulated language.
Claude Lévi-Strauss​[1]​

The biosemiotic view that there exist signs, per se, in animal communication, or in any other communication among living systems, poses the question about the translatability of these signs, both by humans and by other organisms.
Kalevi Kull and Peeter Torop​[2]​


Lévi-Strauss’s familiar remarks on the parallels between birds and humans’ interactions and communications would not have appeared strange to medieval thinkers. Indeed, the Middle Ages contributed a great deal to this transhistorical fascination – the inclination to identify bird society as “homologous to that in which we live,”​[3]​ to see that birds “Among all bestis” appear, like us, to “[folwen] most honest[ee] of kind.”​[4]​ Lévi-Strauss’s observation that birdsong is akin to “articulated language” (langue articulé) echoes a particularly medieval debate on the nature of the articulate, rational voice, in which birds were prominent precisely because their human-sounding vocalizations foregrounded and reified a central worry for medieval theologians: the distinction between rational man (animal rationale) and irrational beast (animal irrationale). Paradoxically, birds’ voices were ubiquitously compared to or depicted as human speech in various discourses because they display vocal abilities, even whilst being rigorously denied this likeness. Avian vocality, that is, could plausibly be considered discrete and articulate, sophisticated and adaptable, but such possibilities were hard to reconcile with mainstream doctrines. 
Within this context, I wish to argue that Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls not only moves beyond typically superficial comparisons with human articulated language, but imagines the potential for translatability between species. In some ways the most obvious candidate for a study on the specifics of nonhuman voice, this poem has received surprisingly little attention in this regard,​[5]​ perhaps because it does not involve explicit human-nonhuman discourse or bird mimicry. In my view, however, the poem’s concerns with interspecies communications and translative acts make birds’ utterances “richly problematic” in the way that Peter W. Travis argues for Thomas’s reverberating fart in the Summoner’s Tale. The “cultural proscription” that claims “certain sounds are insignificant noises” is problematized to produce voices that might be read not as unreasonable nonsense, but as legitimate “counter-harmonics” which, moreover, have significant impact upon our understanding of the dizzyingly complex allegory.​[6]​ The birds and their voices are responsible for a great deal of complication in our attempts to read the poem figuratively, but they also might be key to understanding how we can approach these complications. If the Parliament’s allegory, as so many readers have discovered, refuses to settle, there is some reflection of this in Chaucer’s vociferous assembly of squabbling birds who do not conform to wholesale figuration, whose vocal and symbolic meanings slip in and out of coherency. 
This essay, then, engages recent thinking in animal studies in order to give fuller attention to birds’ voices per se. After examining the difficulties presented to this aim by traditional approaches to allegory, and outlining mainstream medieval thinking on avian vocalizations, I will focus on the well-known, intrusive bird calls line (499) to argue how Chaucer engages with issues of translation, an act which invests the birds’ voices with meaning that is traditionally denied to them in the contexts of both allegory and scholastics. The moment occurs when the lower birds – the seed and water fowl – erupt into outcry at the lengthy and tedious protestations of love from the eagles which last from ‘morwe … / Tyl dounward went the sonne’ (489-90):​[7]​

The goos, the cokkow, and the doke also
So cryede, “Kek kek! kokkow! quek quek!” hye,
That thourgh myne eres the noyse wente tho..
                                                        (498-500)

Impatient to get on with the business of pairing, certain birds take matters into their own hands, and the debate rapidly disintegrates. In this poem about which voices do and do not count, I propose that Chaucer asks us to consider real birds’ voices at line 499 (or, at least, human attempts to replicate their real utterances) because they momentarily take us by surprise, crying forth in a strange semiotic mode. In my view, linguistic translation is brought forcibly to our attention here because it momentarily breaks down, raising queries about categories of species and voice, and places the Middle English spoken by the narrator (and the birds) throughout the poem under scrutiny. It confirms both language barriers and species’ differences, but can also function as a form of sympathetic interspecies translation, a procedure that I will ultimately parallel with the concept of “biotranslation” outlined in my second epigraph to explore what this movement between human and nonhuman languages suggests about meaningful avian utterances, and, consequently, how this can affect our perception of the poem’s allegory at work. Linguistic translation, in other words, has profound implications for the “translation” acts that allegory performs upon the animal figure in this poem.

Allegory – the bird is not a bird
The category of voice persistently announces its importance in the poem: the word itself (382, 558, 638, 545) – along with “tonge” (514, 570, 521) and the associated faculty of “resoun” (564 568, 591) – occurs throughout. Allegorically speaking, though, the problem is that these are not birds’ voices at all; the bird debate genre only asks us to entertain the illusion that birds share our linguistic abilities. The medieval penchant for allegory and exegesis, for thinking of one thing in terms of another, is the overriding problem for scholars attempting to write about real birds and animals in texts that require us to read non-literally. It is, as Onno Oerlemans recognizes, “the mode that best reflects the deep conflict in how we have thought about the relationship between humans and animals.”​[8]​ In conventional terms, allegory makes it “inconsequential to determine whether the fabulous stories connected with the animals are true, but … essential to discover and determine the religious significance they confirm.”​[9]​ Augustine’s words echo clearly in the bestiary materials, those chief medieval texts for allegorical animals. Scholars have begun to tackle these philosophical and textual difficulties, arguing the case for more nuanced category definitions (what medieval texts might have to tell us about species similarity, or how difference is not so easily sustained) in the face of texts which co-opt the nonhuman for human purposes.​[10]​ For those working in the fields of ecocriticism and animal studies, allegory is both vexing and fascinating; a mode necessarily embroiled in the ethics-driven project of representation. When birds speak in allegory, who speaks? Correctly speaking, are we dealing with birds’ voices at all? 
In this respect, the Parliament stands as a typical (but particularly difficult) text for animal studies and its critical kin. A “correct” reading of this allegorical dream vision understands that the avian debate is actually a human debate, and that this premise inflects any birdy attributes we might be tempted to read more literally. From a traditional stance, human socio-political interests are double-filtered through the kaleidoscope of both a dream and a bird debate to a human narrator who relates the matter to a human audience. That birds express reason in articulate language is not of interest in itself, because they are not really birds, only transparent signifiers. Articulate speech from birds is implausible – it only reflects a human ability; orthodox doctrine tells us as much.​[11]​ In this sense, avian language serves as the perfect allegorical tool – a communication that is remarkably comparable to human speech, but is most emphatically not, and, therefore, does not run the risk of confusion.
The fraught history of the Parliament’s interpretation should give us pause for thought, however. Scholars have never been convinced one way or the other about the extent to which the poem functions as allegory. It is a poem beset with hermeneutical problems. Coherent translations between one level and another are consistently thwarted: with its inconsistent allegorical figures, unresolved ending, and hapless narrator who never discovers “that thyng that I wolde” (91), here is an allegory that will not easily be read allegorically; in Carolynn Van Dyke’s phrase, it is “misaligned with its allegorical principles” to the point that it might even be read as a “mock allegory.”​[12]​ The Parliament’s birds have repeatedly avoided satisfactory interpretation, because they “behave as if they were somewhat stylized human beings.”​[13]​ The avian catalog prefacing the debate is a case in point. It is often taken to signal clearly the birds’ allegorical status: every fowl must “take his owne place” (320) according to kind, which is presumed to confer humanized social statuses.​[14]​ But we can also consider this in bird terms (a consistently possible manoeuvre throughout the poem) because Chaucer takes his avian hierarchy, in part, from the works of natural historians, all of whom ultimately derive their observations from Aristotle.​[15]​ Divisions between genera according to food type, that is, are not simply the stuff of allegory – they can also be serious suggestion about avian taxonomy.​[16]​ As much as readers are tempted by allegorical principles to identify birds with human agendas, we cannot dismiss the fact that they also do all the things that birds do: Chaucer’s incomplete allegorization of the nonhuman in the Parliament involves numerous slippages in the anthropomorphic patina. It becomes difficult to know, at times, whether we are talking about birds or humans because parallel levels of figuration cross over: the duck both speaks and quacks (589, 594) and, most famously, wears a hat, a detail that so conspicuously draws attention to anthropomorphic strategies that it actually undermines the expected effect: we are acutely aware that birds don’t actually wear hats.​[17]​ As Van Dyke has usefully noted, “[i]f Chaucer intends to exploit his avian agents to advance a human message, he is an inept imperialist.”​[18]​
Such a to-do about how to understand the mechanics of allegory and the poem’s agendas suggests the continued need to re-examine the birds’ roles; to see, indeed, whether birds might point us towards the sort of animal allegory that Oerlemans has argued for generally in early English literature, able to “simultaneously hide and reveal the contested nature of the boundary between humans and animals.”​[19]​ Rather than aiming for a fully coherent allegorical reading, perhaps we need to consider how the resistances to this approach intentionally demand new ways of conceiving relations between birds and humans. Amidst the slippage of existing interpretative standpoints, there is a space for considering the birds’ voices as something more than anthropomorphized twittering, to give the fowls a little more of their titular prominence in the “commune profyt” (47) or the “speaking together” that Olson identifies as the central civic purpose.​[20]​ As one of the earliest ecocritical studies of the Parliament argues, Chaucer “reminds us forcefully that there is indeed a nonhuman world … unrepresented in his poem,”​[21]​ or, in the context of biosemiotics, “that there exist signs, per se, in animal communication.”​[22]​ It is my contention that Chaucer’s translation interests reveal a little more of this world than has been previously recognized.

Birds and medieval vox
In representing birds’ voices in his poem, particularly ones that squawk at line 499 as though from the pages of a grammar treatise, Chaucer engages another obstacle to credible birdspeak – the considerable body of scholastic writing on the category of vox. On the face of it, in fact, it would hardly seem to matter even if we do accept Chaucer’s birds as genuinely avian, because these institutional discourses emphatically dismissed nonhuman voices as meaningless. The excellent work achieved by current scholars on the nonhuman in medieval culture has familiarized this extensive practice of distinguishing the human from nonhuman, or, more specific to the threat that birds presented, excluding nonhumans from the logocentric standpoint in order that inarticulacy could be taken as a sign of innate irrationality.​[23]​ Birds were a particular case because their vocal abilities, most of all, forced medieval scholars to defend against uncanny similarities with the human that also fascinated them: Isidore of Seville, for instance, remarks of certain mimicking species that “if you did not see the bird you would think a human was speaking,”​[24]​ and in Alain of Lille’s De planctu, a key source for the Parliament, we encounter a human-mimicking parrot who even fools another bird species.​[25]​ Such examples might strike a difficult chord with those aiming to segregate species; there are times when avian vox is too close for comfort. Through rigorously appropriating anomalies into orthodoxy, these authors assuage their fears,​[26]​ but also unavoidably expose them, and the possibility that human categories and systems might not be accurate or sufficient. As Elizabeth Eva Leach notes, “Theorists would not be at such pains to stress the rationality that must inform human … practice if the sound of birds’ songs were not ostensibly musical.”​[27]​ 
Because songbirds and mimicking species do something which, at the least, seems considerably more sophisticated than just producing noise, it comes as no surprise that medieval grammarians and music theorists were the scholars who most fully confronted birdsong in tackling the tricky category of voice (vox). Music, closely allied to grammar in medieval schools, relied upon long-lived Latin traditions from the likes of Probus and Priscian that differentiated between vox articulata and vox confusa. ​[28]​ Singing, to be correctly defined as such by medieval theorists, required articulate language, the property unique to humans: “meaning is defined as verbal or linguistic in content, and thus melody, for all its numerical rationality, is meaningless without text.”​[29]​ Birdsong, in these terms, is meaningless, nothing more than instinctive imitation.​[30]​ 
But birds could slip this net, too. If linguistic discreteness – specifically writeability – is key, then birds presented “an embarrassing situation,” to borrow Umberto Eco’s phrase for the barking dog phenomenon (that other tricky nonhuman utterance well known amongst medieval logicians).​[31]​ Some birds’ voices can plausibly be written down, which incorporates them back into the realm of meaningful. The crow was the usual example (“cra cra”), but the cuckoo – a key dissenter in the Parliament – also produces discrete pitches which can be written down, as, indeed, can the duck and the goose in Chaucer’s rendition at line 499. There was potential, therefore, for blurring between meaningful human noises which could not be written down, and meaningless animal sounds which could be written down. As Leach explains, “This would mean that although whistling and groaning have discreteness … because such sounds do not contain discrete pitches they would rank below not only spoken or sung language but also below the languageless, nonrational, but musically ratioed song of birds.”​[32]​ Alain of Lille’s description of the lark in De planctu seems aware of these potential concerns: the bird performs “not from a study of the technique but from Nature’s teaching ... She separated tones into subtle particles, kept dividing semitones until they reached indivisible units.”​[33]​ Even in Priscian’s more discriminating four-part model, although human sounds are privileged above birdsong, birds still contain their own category above other creatures and human sounds like grinding teeth, indicating their more troublesome position in attempts to classify vox.​[34]​ 
Although orthodox opinions dominated, then, the inconsistences described above meant that it was possible to entertain contradictory paradigms.​[35]​ Recent work on medieval translation theories has begun to play closer attention to texts which tease out these interstitial voices between orthodox categories and taxonomies, such as fourteenth-century hunting treatises,​[36]​ or animal-sound lists.​[37]​ Texts such as these have been said to “effectively thwart the idea that an inarticulate beast occupies a state of linguistic understanding entirely apart from that of the rational, speaking human.”​[38]​ When Chaucer draws our attention to both the vexations and illuminating potential of translation processes, The Parliament of Fowls reveals its own curiosities with inter- or trans-species. Chaucer may begin with a well-established topos in which birds’ voices function as metaphor for human speech, but the figuration blurs so that divisions between articulate and inarticulate utterances do not necessarily pertain, and language takes on a cross-species valence. “The road is open,” to adapt Eco on dogs’ barking again, “for a significant” call of the bird.​[39]​

Translating birdspeak
Susan Crane has commented how “birdsong fills the function of human language” in the larger parallel between birds and human society that feature in medieval romance.​[40]​ In the Parliament, I suggest that the opposite is also possible. The English the birds speak, that is, might be seen as a form of speculative translation, a manoeuvre that Chaucer shows to be fraught with difficulties, but which at least aims to envisage recognition between species and genera (human and nonhuman), despite competing agendas or perspectives that are more concerned with difference than similarity and do not always acknowledge others’ points of view. For the philosopher John Berger, a “lack of common language … guarantees its [the animal’s] distance, its distinctness,”​[41]​ but imaginatively speaking, at least, this is not necessarily an insurmountable boundary. 
These themes are, in fact, recurring interests for Chaucer. In three of the Canterbury Tales, the poet explores exactly this type of interspecies fantasy: there is Phoebus’s crow that can “countrefete the speche of every man” (134); the eloquent “nonhuman but man-like rooster”​[42]​  in the Nun’s Priest Tale, in an age when “Beestes and briddes koude speke and synge” (4071); and the Squire’s Tale, with its talk between a falcon and a princess who is enabled to magically understand birdspeak. Recent work on these texts has yielded some rich studies about how Chaucer “shift[s] the emphasis … in a way that lets the animal world into the equation” with “semantic integrity”​[43]​ to reveal or re-orientate complex interspecies discourse. The Squire’s Tale, in which a bird is explicitly allowed the faculty of species-specific, articulate speech, is a particularly revealing example. It is not that the falcon speaks English in this poem, but that Canacee is able to understand the speech of the bird, to “knowe his menyng openly and pleyn, / And answere hym in his langage” (151-2) which is then fully and conveniently given as Middle English by the Squire. Chaucer does hint at the otherness of the falcon’s speech, though, in his use of the term “leden” (435-6; 478). It is a striking term which seems to defy preferred distinctions between human and nonhuman voices, by offering a catch all polysemy: it conveys every type of utterance from the Latin language to an animal cry, and even specifically birdsong.​[44]​ I propose a similar, if less transparent, enterprise at play in the Parliament whereby an eternal garden in a dream world – suspending the realities of conscious perception – functions something like Canacee’s ring. It is a form of “animal acts [sic]” akin to that envisaged by Jennifer Ham and Matthew Senior: “a quest for another kind of language which merges with the sounds and gestures of animals.”​[45]​ On first entering the garden, the dreamer hears the birds in their usual mode: they “synge” (190) “forth to brynge” (192). By the time he exits the temple and encounters Lady Nature, they speak human language, although they still produce mere “noyse” (312) from time to time. The Parliament does not, of course, involve explicit bird-human discourse, nor does it have the magical apparatus which justifies the possibility of cross-species communication. But whilst translation and cross-species communication do not achieve the full and overt status that they do in his later work, Chaucer’s earlier poem involving talking birds is already preoccupied with these possibilities, and it does allow us to glimpse another kind of language, with profound implications. 
The notion of translation is abruptly brought to our attention at line 499 when we hear what are distinctly avian, not human, utterances. If the Parliament’s allegory is intended to efface or substitute genuine bird voices for human speech, then this aberrant line brings those voices to the fore to disrupt usual interpretive procedures because human and bird voices are set starkly besides one another. In a text that gives human voice to birds and expects us to maintain faith in this superimposition, a sudden moment in which the birds utter bird calls draws our attention specifically to issues of vox categories and translation procedures that otherwise might have been overlooked or lacked relevance. At this point we hear the birds’ “leden,” and it alerts us to the potential for meaningful communication that eludes standard grammarians’ definitions. As an attempt to represent actual birds’ calls, in one sense it engages more profoundly with interspecies communications than does the Squire’s Tale because it confronts the difficulties of translation even as it endorses its potential. 
Linguistic slippage between bird and human languages at this point compromises the allegory; how are we to respond to voices that are no longer recognizably human? To those Latin grammarians, Chaucer’s bird calls would be a prime example of the inarticulate form of sonus that separates birdsong from human singing, and in this orthodox sense they have been more than once interpreted as evidence that these birds are representative of vulgarity and ignorance. To be sure, elsewhere in the poem Chaucer invests the duck and goose with idiomatic speech that is feasibly designed to suggest human class differences, but this line problematizes that particular argument because it drops out of the representative scheme entirely. The slippage, too, reminds us that the narrator’s voice is implicated in the reception and transmission of these calls. Are we to imagine that the line stands as his attempt to translate what he denounces as “noyse”, conveyed verbum pro verbo or sensum pro sensu (to use the terminology known to medieval authors)?​[46]​ In which case, why does he not do so in Middle English? Are we to understand that the dream matrix enables the fantasy of nonhuman to human understanding (a manoeuvre akin to that in the Squire’s Tale), and that the birds do not actually speak English to each other? Or perhaps the birds’ utterances indicate something incomprehensible to the narrator – accurately reported, anomalous bird sounds amongst voices that otherwise genuinely speak English. The line, in fact, both conveys real bird calls, and presents a human mimicking bird calls (a detail with greater comic potential if we envisage a performance context for the poem). The usual procedure of allegory presents human speech through apparent birdspeak, which never actually exists because we only ever hear it as human speech, but line 499 doubles back so that we hear something of that omitted middle voice. 
Arguably, we are more acutely aware at this moment than any other that our reception of the birds’ voices is dependent on the narrator. Indeed, his unexpected rendition of the birds’ utterances reminds us that in other ways throughout the poem he is “inept,” to borrow Van Dyke’s term. It is, after all, the human dreamer’s words which ultimately recount the birds’ discourse, and which shape our perceptions. He is a part of the allegorical scheme, but is remarkably unhelpful in assisting us through the interpretive maze. The role he plays seems as inconsistent or puzzling as many other features of the allegory we noted above: a narrator whose perceptions shape proceedings, and which emphatically do not at the same time; who apparently draws no connection between what he witnesses and that “certeyn thing” (20); and, indeed, dismisses the dream in favour of books “som day … to fare / The bet” (697-9). Without denying the narrator’s physical presence, it is also noticeable, in A. C. Spearing’s words, that the “Dreamer drops almost completely out of sight, as if the birds had squeezed him out of the poem”;​[47]​ the birds take up so much room that “unethe was there space / For me to stonde” (314-5). His guide, Affrican, is also characterized by non-participation, departing early on, and suddenly (169-70). The enigmatic narrator, then, only creates further interpretive difficulties: on the question about what precisely the birds do signify or represent, he does not comment. 
These wider discrepancies impact on the relevance of line 499. When it comes to the bird calls, to what extent do we trust those “erys” which receive and interpret, most times hearing or narrating articulate speech, sometimes inferring “noyse”? Whatever our stance, translation issues are at stake. With the human “translator” engaged, the line is a particularly provocative example of interspecies utterances because it not only plays with bird-to-bird communication (single and plural species), but also an imagined possibility of bird-to-human comprehension. 
The phonetics employed in this line only partly or haphazardly transmit voices across the species divide (like terms in a particular human language that cannot accurately carry over into another) and in this manner occupy a fuzzy middle ground. The “kek kek[s]” and “quek[s]” in themselves are the result of a human attempt to translate, to correlate signs from one language to another, akin to modern ornithologists’ efforts to articulate birdsong,​[48]​ or, in a medieval context, the sounds transcribed as verbs in Latin wordlists or translation texts.​[49]​ All three birds are familiar species with calls that are easily transcribable in human letters. I noted earlier that the cuckoo, commonly featured in Latin grammar texts as an example of vox confusa, is potentially troublesome because its song is writeable and involves discrete pitches. In Middle English, though, cokkow was doubly problematic because it forms a near homophone with cokewold, a pun Chaucer exploits himself to great effect in the Manciple’s Tale (243). The calls in the Parliament do not so obviously convey the uncanny similarity of mimicking voices, but they do highlight an interspecies vocal convergence – humans can sound like birds, and birds can sound like humans. 
Chaucer’s phonetics reveal a familiar paradox of translation. Whilst aiming to familiarize, they equally alienate by denoting difference from human language – it is not and cannot be a full translation, and in this sense attends, however unintentionally, to the ethics of representing otherness. While the phonetics are another form of human representation (closer to the “original,” but still removed from a language that we can fully comprehend), something of the nonhuman is retained in these human attempts at bird mimicry. The limits of our own language are turned against us, a risk that plagues literary human-to-human translations, too, as Chaucer well knew; translating or transcribing always run the risk of getting it wrong.​[50]​ In one respect, then, such unavoidable strangeness confirms orthodox medieval opinion – birds can be safely and thankfully separated from us, their voices dismissed as vox confusa, usefully reinforcing how human rationality makes us superior beings. The voices in the Parliament, however, are not so neatly resolved. We are suspended between grammatical categories: the calls are not articulata in the anthropocentric sense important to grammarians, but they are not emptied to the status of confusa either.​[51]​ Indeed, the positioning of the calls immediately between gripes from the same three birds expressed in Middle English, encourages us to transfer meaning – here are parallel complaints in two modes, a literal form of doublespeak to be processed simultaneously. It is a moment, then, that encourages us, in Hsy’s words, to “not necessarily follow the lead of Priscian and other medieval Latin grammarians by segregating the ‘inarticulate’ animal vox … from rational human speech that can be set to writing.”​[52]​ Rather, the two are blurred so that whilst the animal vox remains ineluctably remote to human understanding, it is not necessarily meaningless. “Kek kek,” and other such onomatopoeic transcriptions, enact this blurring by producing an unorthodox instance of vox: a writeable sound (literata) which is inarticulata to humans, but articulata to birds (or some birds, at least). They might be said to occupy the same territory as tricky, unclassified human sounds, like “tut, tut,” an utterance which, although not a word, is both writeable and meaningful, unlike groaning or sighing (both treatise entries) which are meaningful, but unwriteable. Chaucer’s bird calls are deictic in the way that other, human utterances are; the boundary between articulate and inarticulate depends on who speaks, and who listens.
What is more, the fact that the birds in question go on to make salient and convincing arguments about concerns that are as plausibly avian as they are human (the matter of breeding), suggests that we are not meant to gloss over the line as nothing more than proof of  unintelligibility (avian or human). The goose offers an obvious solution to unrequited love (567) and the duck contests fidelity to one partner with simple logic that is difficult to deny: 

	That men shulde loven alwey causeles!
Who can a resoun fynde or wit in that?
Daunseth he murye that is myrtheles?
Who shulde recche of that is recheles?”
“Ye queke,” seyde the goos, “ful wel and fayre!
There been mo sterres, God wot, than a payre!”
                                                               (590-5)

If we are to assume that the voices of a goose, a cuckoo and a duck feature allegorically as the nonsensical, non-rational chittering of an ill-bred human social class, we must also confront the problem that these birds are neither nonsensical nor non-rational. Indeed, they are thoroughly pragmatic. They dispense solid common sense, which reflects back rather well on the supposedly meaningless “kek[s]” and “quek[s]” employed in the first place to represent their stupidity. That is, a scheme which aims to derogate idiotic proclamations from a lower social class by association with irrational birds’ voices cannot persist when those proclamations are not, in fact, unreasonable, nor disparaged and dismissed, except by those characters whose own principles are no more endorsed or justified by Lady Nature, or by the narrator. If anything, it is the collective, heterogeneous voice of the lower birds which receives implicit approval at the poem’s end, not the elitism of the raptors. As Alastair Minnis has remarked of another unauthorised and outspoken Chaucerian character who delivers profound wisdom, the Wife of Bath, these birds “cannot be contained within discourses which would serve to limit … [their] potency.”​[53]​ The Parliament’s birds, in bird terms, do what such discourses emphatically claim they cannot do.
Perhaps then, those calls do mean something – here is an avian ratio of sorts. They are loaded with the volatility and force of all those diverse voices and perspectives that desire to be heard in competition with the birds of prey that are granted priority – an inclusive alterity that can embrace a human and avian vernacular. To the birds that make these calls, that is, they are as reasonable, intelligible and functional as any other voice in the parliament, including those that more obviously represent an exclusive, elite human standpoint. So, on the one hand, the strange squawks remind us of differences, but on the other, that they cannot be so easily explained away, because they acknowledge both “the recognition of kinship in difference and of difference among kin”; their “language encodes respect for difference, particularly alterity, without repudiating the underlying affinity that is the first prerequisite for knowledge.”​[54]​ 
Equating bird squawking with human speech can, then, be a positive way to explore common meaning-making, an imagined opportunity to understand and appreciate what other species might have to say, despite the differences that separate. To return to that recent concept from biosemiotics defined in my second epigraph, in the context of the Parliament’s coming-together of multiple voices and standpoints, this sort of interspecies project might be read more precisely as a form of “biotranslation.”​[55]​ In outlining this theory, Kalevi Kull and Peeter Torop borrow from Jakob v. Uexküll’s concept of the Umwelt (species-specific sphere or world which interrelates with others’ Umwelten) to postulate that sign systems are shared across life forms and that “Conversation with nature” is conceivable at conscious and unconscious levels.​[56]​ Biotranslation “poses the question of … translatability” between organisms. As a concept, it raises the types of speculative possibilities that biosemiotics does more generally; the notion that “in some very real sense, all living organisms “know” things and have purposes,” that we must “rethink what we might mean by such things as “interpretation,” “mind,” and “knowledge”.”​[57]​ Kull and Torop employ bird calls as an example of what they term “interspecific sign system[s],” in which alarm calls from one species are “translated” by another.​[58]​ As for medieval scholars – although with rather different reactions – the category of bird voice is evident and illuminating as a correlative to human signs or abilities. Movements between languages, modes and perspectives in the Parliament hint at a similar correspondence between and across beings, in confronting the success or failure of different species (including the human) to make individual perspectives compatible.  The species-specific alarms of geese and cuckoos and ducks, articulate to them (like their breeding strategies), may or may not be transmitted to eagles, falcons and doves, and may or may not be interpreted by us. There is also the added joke that, taken literally, the imposed linguistic sign system of human speech would not be understood by the birds. 
Chaucer’s bird call line, however, interrupting the human speech, invites us to bridge the communicative gap. Writing about incomprehensible nonhuman utterances in the Fifteen Signs tradition, Karl Steel argues that there are instances when such utterances produce a “gap deliberately left open, a space that has not been stuffed with human meaning.”​[59]​ This, I suggest, is the case in the Parliament of Fowl’s famous bird call line. It provokes a speculative “biotranslation” act from us at this moment, a playful invitation to imagine what the birds mean (or fail to mean) amongst their own and other species. We project meaning, yes, but meaning that starts with the birds. This creative guess is still an illusion, but at least it has alternative voices in mind. From this angle, the lively vernacular of the goose and duck (“Al this nys not worth a flye!” (501)) is not just a way of characterising lower social classes in human society, but an attempt to translate the otherness of particular species, and that of all nature’s voices.
The transformative act of poetic “translation” becomes a creative “translation technology” of sorts;​[60]​ like Canacee’s ring or an imagined time and place in which all “beestes and briddes koude speke and synge,” it opens up the category of vox articulata. Chaucer’s text contravenes more typical instances of medieval engagements with talking creatures because he offers us a literary key by which we can envisage sonic or perceptive worlds that feasibly exist outside the categorizations of scholarly discourses. Whether it be through a ring, a pre-humanistic world, or a dreamscape, the poet reveals his awareness that he performs translation, demonstrating that, as Leonard Michael Koff has stated in the context of medieval translation theory: “Language is a medium of being and translation is always possible, despite boundaries of place and breed.”​[61]​ The poetic imagination can slide between those “kek[s]” and “quek[s]” and a language that makes sense to us, another species, where it translates as something like “Have don” (492) and “Com of!” (494). So, too, when the goose slips momentarily out of human language to quote the duck’s “queke” (594), but the utterance remains grammatically part of the sentence, functioning as a verb, an elision of bird and human voice that mimics the more famous example in the House of Fame when the eagle cries ‘“Awak!”’ (555). The preferable taxonomic and grammatical boundaries, erected in the first place to achieve the necessary task of proving human exceptionalism, are rendered insufficient in Chaucer’s bird calls because human and nonhuman utterances are bound up in ambiguous and interlocking exchange, and we are prompted to imagine, at least, that these calls carry meaning. 
The Parliament, as all Chaucer’s talking bird texts, resonates with Lévi-Strauss’s poignant assertion about the impossibility of interspecies communication, that

… no situation seems more tragic, more offensive to heart and mind, than that of a humanity coexisting and sharing the joys of a planet with other living species yet being unable to communicate with them.​[62]​

Literature is not real life, and Chaucer’s poetic translations can hardly be said to compensate for our inability to know the mysteries of nonhuman creatures. But such attempts might be all we have – incomplete and unstable, but still worthwhile. As Sarah E. McFarland has stated:

To envisage the umwelt [sic] or self-world of nonhuman animals is to speculate in terms of human experience and using human languages; the empathy necessary is somewhat illusory because there is no other way to speculate.​[63]​

Chaucer envisages what communicating might be like, and, in doing so, implies that humans are not the only subjective beings capable of meaning. Chaucer’s birds inhabit the “langue articulé,” and even this imagined possibility suggests that there might be something worth listening to. When it comes to procreation – the reason for the parliament in the first place – for many birds and many humans, why indeed would one “loven alwey causeles?” Do you think the question mark might come after the quotes here?

Allegory revisited – translating other voices
In his now well-known discussion of the allegorical animal, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen concludes that, sometimes, medieval writers “lead us to a middle space where allegories and moralizations seem insufficient in their power to contain.”​[64]​ The Parliament of Fowls creates just such a middle space because, as we noted earlier, the poem is shot through with allegorical inconsistencies. Species jostle together, distinct and combined, in a “universal epithalamium, in which not only man, but the entire natural world participates.”​[65]​ On the matter of breeding, birds speak earnestly and belligerently on behalf of birds; by their “owene autorite” (506) they will “telle oure tale” (560), resisting the demands of other birds, and humans. (It is the human narrator, in fact, who can “telle no tale” (326), rather comically on the distinctly avian point of eating worms.) A worm-eating, parasitic cuckoo, acting as “Nature wolde enclyne” (325) is berated viciously by a merlin who behaves like a lofty aristocrat. The cuckoo – a pointed example in the poem – can be anthropomorphized, read as a “mortherere” (612), but it is also idiosyncratically and uniquely a cuckoo, whose habits cannot be easily reduced to other perspectives, human or otherwise. Under these circumstances, love, the theme with which the poem commences, takes on a decidedly cross-species relevance, as complex and diverse as species themselves: raptors who uphold a sustained anthropomorphic vision of fin amour (which leads to failed breeding altogether) are chided and mocked by those who promote their own breeding habits and cry out “lat us wende!” (492) The natural or instinctive breeding preferences of the lower order birds can be read allegorically, but they are most certainly the stuff of avian concerns too. Like the famous Boethian caged-bird simile in the Squire’s Tale, most of the birds do as their instincts urge despite the demands of allegory (which come, ironically, from other birds within the text, as well as the manipulating hand of a human author): they return “to the wode … and wormes ete” (ST, 617). Metaphor as it is, even this example undercuts itself, as occurs in the Parliament – we must believe that “A bird imagines that another bird modelled its actions on a comparison of men’s behaviour to that of birds.”​[66]​ 
As we have seen, birds’ voices, as much as their behaviours, tie us in similar hermeneutical and semiotic knots; they gesture, too, at the “insufficient … power” of other discourses, prompting us to reconsider the significance of avian vocality in relation to human speech. Attending more closely to these voices can show us how allegory is not only insufficient at times, but is also, more positively, capable of operating in even more nuanced terms than we suspected. Ultimately, the poem’s allegory need not hinder us from recognizing that birds in the poem can sometimes be actual birds. The discrepancies, in fact, should encourage us to seek more complex and varied aspects of Chaucer’s species relationships, so that we do not necessarily or consistently read one species as replacing another, but allow for the possibility of an inter- or cross-species dynamic. The act of translating birds correlates linguistic translation with the processes of this allegory dynamic, to the hermeneutical and ethical act that this poem requires us to engage with – how should we, and to what extent is it possible, to “translate” another species, another subjectivity, whether human or nonhuman? 
Moreover, this is not a suggestion that need work against more widespread allegorical hermeneutics. Some recent work (such as that in what has been named the “religious turn”) argues for the sort of “both/and” dynamic inherent to Augustinian allegory in order to recognize how apparent opposites,​[67]​ the sacred and secular, often co-exist in medieval texts, and do not demand that we choose one over the other. Matilda Tomaryn Bruckner, for instance, has remarked in the context of romance that “[O]pposing terms remain present, equally valid, as they interact in a potentially creative tension that neither dismisses nor suppresses either one.”​[68]​ The “both/and” hermeneutic is, such scholars recommend, far more prevalent that has been previously acknowledged, and can allow audiences to “choose between meanings.”​[69]​ In applying this thinking to the Parliament, we might detect a similar relation between literal and metaphorical elements capable of negotiating or manipulating the traffic between referents to reveal a conjectured alterity, leading to that “place of dispersal, multiple agency, and intercorporeality” recommended by Cohen.​[70]​ If animal allegory has been long understood as casting the nonhuman in human terms in order to explore human matters, sometimes we catch something of the animal terms, too, reversing our attempts to superimpose so that some of that we intend for the human tenor (meaningful voices) rubs off on the feathered vehicle. To re-echo the Boethian caged-bird metaphor, it is possible for allegory to liberate rather than constrain, to be something other than a form that simply converts into humanized symbolic meaning and demands a singular reading.
To extend our understanding of this simultaneity principle, we can think of the parallel between allegorical and vocal transmissions alongside the more obvious translation project that occurs in the poem (and, indeed, across the “Grant translateur[’s]” works).​[71]​ Chaucer’s English – whether deliberating between literal or loose relationships with other elite or institutional languages, or negotiating its way with adopted forms and prosodies – involves itself in another delicate manoeuvre between “species.” In the broadest sense, the Parliament borrows and transposes Italian and French genres, texts, forms and metres to produce a rich “speaking together” composite.​[72]​ Rime royal, still a conspicuously new form of foreign origin in the Parliament, allows Chaucer to fluently incorporate and translate whole ottava rima passages from Boccaccio’s Teseida into the description of Venus’s temple, and to convey the “colloquial, ‘palpable’” style, which he had perfected in the eagle’s speeches in The House of Fame and which he uses here to such fine effect in the debate of the birds.”​[73]​ Translation, in all these senses, facilitates movement between various types of voices, not simply replacing, but assimilating in a “both/and” (or cross-species) dynamic. Most specifically, though, the final stage of the poem combines birdsong and human song, French and English, in a manner that consciously points up the poem’s translation procedures. The “note” – both birdsong and human song – ​[74]​ envisages a distinctly human performance and reception, but is also assigned a perfectly natural avian characteristic: that birds “synge … / was alwey hir usaunce” (673-4). The numerous sounds involved here – birdsong, human singing, the spoken utterance, musical notes – all feature in medieval grammatical and musical theories on the articulate voice (the last of these, for instance, is similar to human speech in possessing qualities of discreteness and writeability, despite not being language). The effect, though, created by the complex interplay of voces at this moment, is not to separate or dismiss categories, but to give further credence to Chaucer’s attempts at translating birds through comparison with other validated forms of translation when all come together in one grand utterance. The birds’ “roundel” (675) is clearly identified – it “imaked was in Fraunce” (677); a foreign song form from a foreign language, but sung in English, the same language that has enacted bird-to-human speech, yet all the while remaining aware of its Frenchness. It is apparently translated for us by the narrator in the same way as I have suggested he translates the birds’ note: “The wordes were swiche as ye may heer fynde, / The nexte vers, as I now have in mynde” (678-9). The birds are at the centre of a double translation act that exposes those delicate movements between sounds and voices, without eclipsing either note.
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